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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DESERET COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation,

. .

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,)

v.
JSJ CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
DefendantRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT
Case No. 16992

I. INTRODUCTION
This is an action to rescind a contract for a custommade pharmaceutical packaging machine manufactured by defendantrespondent JSJ Corporation (hereinafter defendant) and sold to
plaintiff-appellant Deseret Company (hereinafter plaintiff).

The

machine, which cost over $90,000.00, was installed at plaintiff's
Sandy, Utah, facility under the supervision of defendant's employees,
who traveled to Utah to oversee the work.

The machine has never

functioned properly despite several on-site repair efforts by
defendant's employees.

Plaintiff brought suit seeking to have the

machine removed from its Sandy plant and to have the money that it
has already paid--some $62,000.00--returned.

The trial court

dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, and this appeal is from that dismissal.
In its brief, defendant takes issue with portions of
plaintiff's Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff does not believe that

the disputed facts are material to the resolution of this matter,
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so plaintiff will not argue them further.

The issues between the

parties involve not the facts, but their legal significance, so
this reply will be confined to those legal issues.
As a prefatory matter, it is worth noting the timing of
the trial court's decision in relation to significant recent
decisions of this Court.

The defendant's motion to quash was

granted on February 19, 1980, and that order was amended by stipulation of the parties on March 5.

on March 4 and March 6, 1980,

this Court issued two highly significant opinions on the subject
of in personam jurisdiction.

Plaintiff argued in its brief that

the exercise of jurisdiction in this case was mandated not only by
the new cases but by Utah law as it existed prior to those

decision~

In its brief, defendant couched its arguments in terms of those

decisions, tacitly acknowledging the proposition that the controlli1
case law is that which exists at the time of the appeal.

Without

conceding that the exercise of jurisdiction would have been imprope:
under prior case law, plaintiff restricts its arguments in this
reply to the effect of those recent decisions.
II. ARGUMENTS
1.

All matters argued by plaintiff in its brief are

properly before this Court.
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that:
Defendant has transacted business and is doing
business in the State of Utah pursuant
to the applicable provisions of the Utah
"long-arm" statute, and is subject to the
jurisdiction of the above-entitled court.
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(Complaint, , 8).

In its brief to the trial court in opposition

to defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
plaintiff argued that three sections of the Utah long-arm
statute, Utah Code Ann.
action.

§

78-27-24 (1977), are pertinent to this

They are:
(1) The transaction of any business within
this State;
(2) Contracting to supply goods and services
in this State;
(3) The causing of any injury within this
State whether tortious or by breach of warranty

Utah Code Ann.

§

78-27-24(1)-(3) (1977).

Defendant asserts in its brief to this Court that the
issues on appeal must be confined narrowly to the pleadings (Respondent's Brief at 8).

Defendant contends that the only subsection of

the long-arm statute properly invoked by plaintiff is subsection
(1) relating specifically to "transaction of business."
unrealistically restrictive.

This is

While plaintiff used the phrase

"transaction of business" in its complaint, it did so in a general
and inclusive fashion, and referred to "relevant" provisions of the
long-arm statute without specifying which provisions it considered
those to be.

Moreover, in its brief to the trial court, plaintiff

fully argued the applicability of all three sections of the statute.
(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Service of
Process and/or to Dismiss at 3-5, 7-8).

Thus, the rule that issues

may not be raised for the first time on appeal is not violated in
this case.

The purposes of that rule are to prevent surprise and

prejudice to the successful party below, and to promote judicial
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economy by barring piecemeal presentation of legal theories.
Neither of those purposes is in any way jeopardized by considering
all of plaintiff's arguments on appeal in this case.

Plaintiff is

within the scope of its pleadings, and no issue is being presented
to this Court that was not fully presented to the trial court.

The

defendant has not and cannot allege surprise or prejudice, nor can
judicial economy be undermined by considering the applicability of
all of the provisions of the long-arm statute in this action.
2.

Defendant transacted business within the State of

Utah.
The Utah Code defines "transaction of business" as
follows:
Activities of a nonresident person, his
agents or representatives in this State which
affect persons or businesses within the State
of Utah.
Utah Code Ann.

§

78-27-23 (1977).

Plaintiff has claimed that

defendant falls under the ambit of that provision both by virtue
of an agent's 1975 visit to Utah in an effort to persuade plaintiff
to purchase one of defendant's machines, and by sending technicians
to Utah to install and later attempt to repair the machine in
question.

Defendant tries to avoid the clear implication of those

activities within the State of Utah by saying that the initial
visit to Utah by one of its representatives did not result in the
purchase of a machine (Respondent's Brief at 3-4).
is conclusory at best.

Such an asserti(

While it may be true that the trip did not

immediately bear fruit for defendant, it is undisputed that plainti.
sent samples of packaging materials and specifications to defendant
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plant in Michigan in 1977, and the contract for the machine in
question ensued.

Plainly, plaintiff would not have invited a bid

proposal from a manufacturer with whom it had no previous contact.
Thus, it cannot be said that a salesman's visit to Utah in 1975
did not prompt the initiation of negotiations leading to the
purchase of this machine in 1977.
Defendant claims that the installation and repair
activities in Utah do not constitute transaction of business
because they are not the activities "which give rise and/or
result in appellant's claim" (Respondent's Brief at 9).

Defendant

makes this argument by asserting that installation and repair
efforts were undertaken pursuant to an installation contract,
while plaintiff has alleged a breach of a manufacturing contract.
This argument depends on defendant's assertion that what is involved
are two contracts, not one.
by the facts.

That argument is simply unsupported

The document in question consists of four pages,

all of which are marked "Dake Proposal No. 40247 (B). 11
attachment to complaint).

(See

Defendant's form Sales Agreement and

the specifications for this particular machine are marked as pages
2 and 3 of that proposal.

The Dake Installation Policy, which

defendant contends is a separate contract, is marked page 4 of 4
in "Dake Proposal No. 40247(B)," and is signed by Lees. Kihnke
for Dake.

That is the only place in the four-page proposal in

which a signature appears.
The document in question, then, consists of four pages,
all with the same proposal number and marked as pages 1 through 4
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of 4.

The document is signed once and only once--at the bottom of

page 4.

The document was drafted by the defendant.

It is diffi-

cult to take seriously defendant's allegations that such a document is anything but a single, unified contract, or that defendant
understood it as anything else.

This cause of action arises out

of that single contract, and activities undertaken pursuant to one
of its provisions necessarily amount to "transaction of business"
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

§

78-27-23 (1977).

Defendant further contends that a single transaction or
occurrence within the State of Utah cannot support jursidiction

under subsection (1) of the long-arm statute (Respondent's Brief at;
10).

In support of that conclusion, defendant cites the concurrence

of Justice Stewart in the case of Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill,
608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).

In that concurring opinion, Justice

Stewart observed that in the past, the Court had generally required:
more than a single act to sustain long-arm jurisdiction under the
"transaction of business" provision.

Therefore, Justice Stewart

would have preferred the Court to base its exercise of jurisdiction
on subsection (3), relating to the causing of injury by breach of
warranty within the state.

In citing the concurrence, however,

defendant ignores the plurality opinion in that case, which sguarel1
held that a single transaction by an out-of state manufacturer
whose only activity in Utah was an attempt to repair a defective
piece of equipment was sufficient to sustain jurisdiction within
the meaning of subsections (1), (2) or (3). 608 P.2d at 247.
Defendant's citation is to dicta in a concurrence.

Plaintiff,
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however, points to the square holding of the case in question,
which fully supports its position.
3.

Defendant contracted to supply services in Utah.

Defendant's brief did not dispute the proposition that
it contracted to supply services within the State of Utah.

Defendant argues, however, that the services were supplied pursuant
to the installation contract, while the cause of action arises out
of the manufacturing contract (Respondent's Brief at 10-11).
Again, this argument is predicated on the two-contract theory.
That theory, as noted previously, is without a basis in fact.

In

making such an argument, defendant is attempting to invoke the
holding of Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah
1980).

In that case, the plaintiff brought an action for a com-

mission allegedly due on a sale of goods from a non-resident
manufacturer to a Utah purchaser.

All of the contacts relating to

the alleged oral contract to pay the commission occurred out of
state.

This Court held jurisdiction improper, because the allegedly

breached oral contract for a commission and the contract to furnish
goods to a Utah manufacturer were completely separate.

The two

contracts were negotiated at different times, for different
consideration, and among different parties.

The facts of Roskelley,

then, are quite unlike those in the present case.

Moreover, the

language of Roskelley itself directs the assumption of jurisdiction
in a case such as this.

The Roskelly Court said:

Here, defendant's purposeful activities within
this State consisted of its sale of equipment
ultimately destined for installation in this
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State, and its entry into this State for the
purpose of overseeing the installation of that
equipment. These contacts would be sufficient
for the establishment of limited jurisdiction
if this litigation concerned an action for
breach of warranty or negligence in installing
the equipment. . . . but this plaintiff cannot
avail himself of such contacts for the purpose
of his claim on an entirely different contract.
610 P.2d at 1312 (emphasis supplied).
apply Roskelley favorably must fail.

Thus, defendant's effort to
In that case, an out-of-

state manufacturer had contracted to supply goods to a Utah

busines~

Just as in this case, defendant's employees entered the State of
Utah only for the purpose of installation and service of the
equipment involved.

As this Court made a point of noting, those

contacts would be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction in "an action r
breach of warranty."

Id.

Defendant's case, then, argues for, not

against, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.
4.

Defendant caused injury in the State of Utah within :

the meaning of the long-arm statute.
The final relevant provision of Utah's long-arm statute
allows the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes
"any injury within this State whether tortious or by breach of
warranty.

11

Utah Code Ann.

§

78-27-24(3)(1977).

Defendant argues

that this provision is inapplicable because plaintiff seeks
rescission of the contract rather than monetary damages (Respondent's Brief at 14-15).

The plain import of the statutory di-

rective, however, is that Utah's courts should exercise jurisdiction over legally cognizable warranty or tort claims.

The provisio
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does not suggest that the particular type of remedy sought is
important.

Defendant cites no authority for the rather strange

proposition that when a Utah court sits as a court of equity, its
jurisdiction has a smaller geographical reach than when it sits as
a court of law.*

It is submitted that defendant has done abso-

lutely nothing to negative the application of subsection (3) of
the long-arm statute to this cause of action.
5.

Defendant has not distinguished controlling Utah

case law.
On March 4, 1980, after the trial court's granting of
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
this court decided the case of Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608
P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).
in this case.

The facts are virtually identical to those

In Burt, a Utah corporation contacted a California

manufacturer and arranged to purchase some well drilling equipment.
The contact was initiated by the Utah plaintiff.

It was negotiated

*

Defendant makes this argument somewhat more difficult to grasp
It does so by citing Hydroswift Corp.
v. Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972),
for the proposition that the causing of financial injury within
Utah will not support Utah's exercise of jurisdiction. That case,
h?wev~r~ says no more than that an out-of-state act causing financial inJury does not come under the purview of the long-arm
sta~ut~ merely because the a~grieved party is a Utahn, an argument
plaintiff does not make. This argument is also inconsistent with
the idea propounded by defendant that plaintiff is not seeking
damages. Plaintiff again suggests that the reach of the long-arm
sta~ut~ depends on defendant's acts, not on the remedy sought by
plaintiff.

by immediately abandoning it.
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without any representative of the defendant having set foot within
the State of Utah.
Colorado.

The machine was delivered not to Utah, but to

From there, it was taken first to New Mexico, where it

broke, then finally to Utah, where it continued to malfunction.
that point, the defendant sent a repair crew to Utah in an
ful effort to fix the machine.

At

unsucces~;

On those facts, this Court reversed

a trial court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and
remanded for trial.

Defendant attempts to distinguish the Burt case by saying;
that the record there indicated that the defendant was a

nationwide~

corporation, which could reasonably be expected to defend suits in
distant forums (Respondent's Brief at 20-21).

While that may have

been the case, it was not mentioned by the Court.

In this case,

evidence of the nationwide character of defendant's business appears
in a form far more persuasive than any affidavit--the machine,
manufactured in Michigan, was installed in plaintiff's plant in
Sandy, Utah.

Were defendant not a multi-state concern, it would

not have been willing or able to make that transaction.

Second,

defendant claims that in Burt, defendant retained a security intereE
in the machinery, and that the existence of such an interest was
crucial.

The opinion, however, does not sustain that interpretatior

While the Court alluded to the existence of the security interest,
it saw that merely as evidence of the purposeful nature of the
defendant's act.

608 P.2d at 247.

The dissent in Burt undercuts

this argument by pointing out that no agreement was ever filed in
Utah or any other state, and that whatever form the document in
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question took, it could have no legal status as a security agreement.

608 P.2d at 253.

Plainly, then, that point was not disposi-

tive in Burt.
6.

Subjecting defendant to Utah's jurisdiction would not

violate Due Process.
Defendant devotes much of its brief to the citation of
cases from other jurisdictions which held, under facts similar to
these, that the exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process
notions embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State
Constitution (Respondent's Brief at 15-18).
doubtful value.

Such cases are of

The most recent one is fourteen years old.

In few

fields of law has evolution occurred as rapidly or continuously as
in the expansion of in personam jurisdiction.

Experience with

long-arm statues has indicated that justice is well-served by
interpreting them liberally.

Therefore, it does defendant little

good to point out that a Texas court denied jurisdiction in a
similar fact situation in 1966 (Respondent's Brief at 18), or that
the Fourth Circuit Court did so in 1956 (Respondent's Brief at 17).
It is quite likely that this Court would have refused to exercise
jurisdiction in the Burt Drilling case fifteen years ago.
In a companion case to Burt Drilling, Mallory Engineering,
Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, No. 15530 & 15544 (Utah, March 6,
1980), this Court held that a nonresident supplier of goods could
be subject to Utah jurisdiction when it manufactured "products for
interstate distribution," and when the amount in controversy was
sufficient to dissuade the nonresident from defaulting.

(Slip Op.
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at 4).

Defendant attempts to distinguish Mallory by arguing that

in that case, unlike this one, defendant had contracted to supply
goods in the State of Utah (Respondent's Brief at 22). Here, the
contract called for shipment "F.O.B. Dake's plant of manufacture."
(See attachment to complaint).

By that term, defendant was obliged

to deliver the finished machine to an unspecified carrier for
transportation to Utah.

The fact that the "carrier" turned out to

be a truck owned by plaintiff was not a material provision of the
contract.

If the mere fact that a contract called for F.O.B.

shipment were sufficient to defeat a buyer's invocation of long-arm:
jurisdiction, the reach of such statutes would be drastically
curtailed by the ubiquity of such terms.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This is an action for rescission of a contract to purchas·
a large packaging machine.

The machine was to be manufactured at

defendant's Grand Haven, Michigan, plant, for use at plantiff's
Sandy, Utah facility.

Pursuant to the purchase contract, the

machine was installed under the supervision of factory-trained
technicians that defendant sent to Utah from Michigan.

The machine

has never functioned properly, despite repair efforts made by
workers sent from Michigan by the defendant.

When efforts to

resolve the dispute failed, this litigation ensued.

The trial

court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, and plaintiff took this appeal.
In its brief to this Court, plaintiff argued that a
series of recent decisions on long-arm jurisdiction require a
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reversal of the trial court's dismissal of this action.
defendant has made three major arguments.

In response,

First, defendant has

argued that there are two contracts between the parties in this
case.

They argue that all Utah contacts occurred pursuant to an

installation contract, which it contends was properly performed,
whereas this action arises out of an alleged breach of a separate
manufacturing contract.

As plaintiff has shown, both the manufacture

and installation of the machine in question were undertaken pursuant
to a four-page writing numbered pages one through four of four and
signed only once, at the bottom of page four.

Plainly, both parties

contemplated that a single, unified contract governed their relationship.
Second, defendant has argued that the only issue properly
before this Court is whether it "transacted business" within the
meaning of subsection (1) of Utah's long-arm statute.

Defendant

premises this argument on a highly restrictive reading of the
complaint.

However, the applicability of three subsections of the

long-arm statute was fully argued to the trial court.
Finally, defendant contends that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case would violate the due process provisions of
the constitution.

Defendant supports that argument by citing a

number of relatively old cases from other jurisdictions that have
so held.

However, the concept of due process in relation to long-

arm jurisdiction is hardly static.

Decisions of other courts

handed down between 15 and 25 years ago are of little relevance in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

light of recent Utah case law directing the assumption of jurisdiction in cases factually indistinguishable from the present
action.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the
lower court's dismissal of this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, and should remand the matter for trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this
1980.
/
1-~
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KEITH E. TAYLOR
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of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
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